IoT devices are increasingly deployed in daily life. Many of these devices are, however, vulnerable due to insecure design, implementation, and configuration. As a result, many networks already have vulnerable IoT devices that are easy to compromise. This has led to a new category of malware specifically targeting IoT devices. However, existing intrusion detection techniques are not effective in detecting compromised IoT devices given the massive scale of the problem in terms of the number of different types of devices and manufacturers involved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many new device manufacturers are entering the IoT device market, bringing out products at an ever-increasing pace. This "rush-to-market" mentality of some manufacturers has led to poor product design practices in which security considerations often remain merely an afterthought. Consequently, many devices are released with inherent security vulnerabilities that can be exploited, which has led to an entirely new category of malware explicitly targeting IoT devices [1] - [4] .
The preferred way to cope with vulnerabilities are security patches for the affected devices [5] . However, many devices lack appropriate facilities for automated updates or there may be significant delays until device manufacturers provide them, mandating the use of reactive security measures like intrusion detection systems (IDS) for detecting possible device compromise [6] - [9] . Signature-based IDSs look for specific communication patterns, so-called attack signatures, associated with known attacks. Such systems are, however, unable to detect novel attacks until the IDS vendor releases attack signatures for them [6] .
To detect previously unknown attacks anomaly detection needs to be used which works by profiling the normal behavior of devices and detecting attacks as deviations from this normal behavior profile [7] - [9] . However, this approach often suffers from a high false alarm rate, making it unusable in practice. This problem is exacerbated in the IoT setting: First, there are hundreds of very heterogeneous devices on the market, which making it challenging to train a precise detection model covering all behaviors of various IoT devices. Second, IoT devices do typically not (notwithstanding a few exceptions) generate a lot of network traffic, as their communications are limited to, e.g., status updates about sensor readings or (relatively) infrequent interactions related to user commands. This scarcity of communications makes it challenging to train comprehensive models that can accurately cover the full behavior of IoT devices.
An effective anomaly detection model needs to capture all benign patterns of behavior to be able to differentiate them from malicious actions. The ever-increasing number of literally thousands of types of IoT devices (ranging from temperature sensors and smart light bulbs to big appliances like washing machines) and the typical scarcity of their communications, makes an all-encompassing behavior model 1) tedious to learn and update, and 2) too broad to be effective at detecting subtle anomalies without generating many false alarms. Goals and Contributions. To tackle the above challenges we present DÏOT, a system for detecting compromised IoT devices. It uses a novel device-type-specific anomaly detection approach to achieve accurate detection of attacks while generating almost no false alarms. Major IoT device vendors, including Cisco, assisted us formulating real-world settings for our solution and usage scenarios.
We make the following contributions: • DÏOT, a self-learning distributed system for security monitoring of IoT devices (Sect. II) based on device-typespecific detection models for detecting anomalous device behavior: -It utilizes a novel anomaly detection approach based on representing network packets as symbols in a language allowing to use a language analysis technique to effectively detect anomalies (Sect. III).
-It is the first system to apply a federated learning approach for aggregating anomaly-detection profiles for intrusion detection (Sect. IV).
• Systematic and extensive experimental analysis using more than 30 off-the-shelf IoT devices, showing that DÏOT is fast (detection in ≈257 ms) and effective (95.6 % true positive rate, zero false alarms, i.e., 0 % false positive rate) (Sect. VI). • An Attack dataset of network traffic generated by real off-the-shelf consumer IoT devices infected with real IoT malware (Mirai [1] ) using which we evaluate the effectiveness of DÏOT (Sect. V-A). We will make our datasets as well as the DÏOT implementation available for research use.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Our system model is shown in Fig. 1 . We consider a typical SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) network, where IoT devices connect to the Internet via an access gateway.
A. System Architecture
The DÏOT system consists of Security Gateway and IoT Security Service. The role of Security Gateway is to monitor devices and perform anomaly detection in order to identify compromised devices in the network. It is supported by IoT Security Service, which can be, e.g., a service provider like Microsoft, Amazon or Google that aggregates device-typespecific anomaly detection models trained by all Security Gateways in the system. 1) Security Gateway: acts as the local access gateway to the Internet to which IoT devices connect over WiFi or Ethernet. It hosts the Anomaly Detection component. When a new device is added to the network, Security Gateway identifies its type as outlined in Sect. II-C. The Anomaly Detection component monitors the communications of identified IoT devices and detects abnormal communication behavior that is potentially caused by malware (Sect. III) based on anomaly detection models it trains locally and which are aggregated by the IoT Security Service to a global detection model.
2) IoT Security Service: supports Security Gateway by maintaining a repository of device-type-specific anomaly detection models. When a new device is added to the local network, Security Gateway identifies its device type and retrieves the corresponding anomaly detection model for this type from IoT Security Service. IoT Security Service also aggregates updates to device-type-specific anomaly detection models provided by the Security Gateways in the system.
B. Adversary Model and Assumptions
Adversary. The adversary is IoT malware performing attacks against, or launching attacks from, vulnerable devices in the SOHO network. Hereby we consider all actions undertaken by the malware that it performs to discover, infect and exploit vulnerable devices as discussed in detail in Sect. V-A3.
Defense goals. The primary goal of DÏOT is to detect attacks on IoT devices in order to take appropriate countermeasures, e.g., by preventing targeted devices from being compromised or isolating compromised devices from the rest of the network. We aim to detect attacks at the earliest stage possible, preferably even before a device can be successfully infected.
In addition, we make following assumptions: 
C. Device-Type Identification
As DÏOT uses device-type specific anomaly detection models, it requires the possibility to identify the type of devices in the network. Several solutions have been designed to automatically identify and label unknown IoT devices in a network [12] - [14] . Alternatively, manufacturer-provided explicit device-type specifications like MUD [15] or manual labeling of IoT devices could be used. For DÏOT, we selected an existing approach -AuDI [14] that autonomously identifies the type of individual IoT devices in a local network. This approach is accurate and fast (requiring only 30 minutes to identify device type at the accuracy of 98.2 %). This approach considers abstract device types representing families of similar devices from the same device manufacturer with similar hardware and software configurations, resulting in highly identical communication behavior. It can be trained without the need to manually label communication traces of pre-defined real-world device types since it works by clustering device fingerprints so that each cluster can be automatically labeled with an abstract label, e.g., type#k which represents a specific IoT device type. It justifies our assumption A3 as mentioned above.
Using this approach we can reliably map devices to a corresponding device type for which DÏOT can build a devicetype-specific model of normal behavior that can be used to effectively detect anomalous deviations. This allows DÏOT to be trained and operated autonomously, without the need for human intervention at any stage. 
E. Design Choices 1) Gateway monitoring:
As on-device monitoring is rarely feasible due to challenge C2, we perform monitoring of IoT device communications on Security Gateway.
2) Device-type-specific anomaly detection: Since different IoT devices can have very heterogeneous behaviors (challenge C3), we model each device type's behavior with a dedicated model. Consequently, each model needs to cover only the behavior of a specific device type. As IoT devices are typically single-use appliances with only a few different functions, their behavior patterns are relatively static and limited, allowing the model to accurately capture all possible legitimate behaviors of a device type. Thus, the model is less prone to trigger false alarms (details in Sect. VI-D), thereby effectively addressing challenge C3.
3) Federated learning approach:
Anomaly detection models are learned using a federated learning approach where Security Gateways use locally collected data to train local models which IoT Security Service aggregates into a global model (details in Sect. IV). This aggregation maximizes the usage of limited information obtained from scarce communications at each gateway (challenge C4) and helps to improve the accuracy of anomaly detection models by utilizing all available data for learning. 4) Autonomous self-learning: Anomaly detection models are trained using data autonomously labeled with the devicetype that generated it. Device types are also learned and assigned in an autonomous manner. The whole process does therefore not require any human intervention, which allows DÏOT to respond quickly and autonomously to new threats, addressing challenge C1. It is worth noting that DÏOT starts operating with no anomaly detection model. It learns and improves these models as Security Gateways aggregate more data.
5) Modeling techniques requiring little data:
As discussed in detail in Sect. III, we select features and machine learning algorithms (GRU) that can be efficiently trained even with few training data. This design choice addresses challenge C4.
III. DEVICE-TYPE-SPECIFIC ANOMALY DETECTION
Our anomaly detection approach is based on evaluating the communication patterns of a device to determine whether it is consistent with the learned benign communication patterns of that particular device type. The detection process is shown in Fig. 2 . In Step 1 the communication between the Security Gateway and the IoT device is captured as a sequence of packets pkt 1 , pkt 2 , . . .. Each packet pkt i is then in Step 2 mapped to a corresponding symbol s i characterizing the type of the packet using a mapping that is based on distinct characteristics c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 7 derived from each packet's header information as discussed in Sect. III-A. The mapped sequence of symbols s 1 , s 2 , . . . is then in Step 3 input into a pretrained model using Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [16] , [17] . The GRU model will calculate a probability estimate p i for each symbol s i based on the sequence of k preceding symbols s i−k , s i−k+1 , . . . , s i−1 . GRU is a novel approach to recurrent neural networks (RNN) currently being a target of lively research. GRUs provide similar accuracy as other RNN approaches but are computationally less expensive [17] , [18] . In Step 4 the sequence of occurrence probability estimates p 1 , p 2 , . . . is evaluated to determine possible anomalies. If the occurrence probabilities p i of a sufficient number of packets in a window of consecutive packets fall below a detection threshold, as described in detail in Sect. III-B, the packet sequence is deemed anomalous and an alarm is raised.
A. Modelling Packet Sequences
Data packets pkt i in the packet sequence pkt 1 , pkt 2 , . . . emitted by an IoT device are mapped into packet symbols s i based on 7-tuples (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 7 ) of discrete packet characteristics c i of packet pkt i . This mapping is defined by 
the domain of raw network packets pkt and B type#k is the domain of packet symbols s for device-type type#k . Mapping mapping type#k assigns each unique combination of packet characteristics (c 1 , . . . , c 7 ) a dedicated symbol s representing the 'type' of the particular packet.
We use the following packet characteristics shown also in Tab. I:
• c 1 direction: (incoming / outgoing) Normal TCP traffic is usually balanced two-way communication but abnormal is not as, e.g., a bot only sends packets to a victim without receiving replies when running DDoS attacks. • c 2 and c 3 local and remote port type: (system / user / dynamic) Each device-type uses specific ports designed by the manufacturers while malicious attack patterns usually use different ports.
• c 4 packet length: (bin index of packet's length where eight most frequently occurring packet lengths receive dedicated bins and one bin for other packet length values)
Each device-type communicates using specific packet patterns with specific packet lengths that are mostly different in malicious attack patterns. local port type bin index of port type c 3 remote port type bin index of port type c 4 packet length bin index of packet length c 5 TCP flags TCP flag values c 6 protocols encapsulated protocol types c 7 IAT bin bin index of packet inter-arrival time Fig. 3a shows an example of the occurrence frequencies of individual packet symbols for benign and attack traffic (as generated by the Mirai malware) for Edimax smart power plugs. It can be seen that using packet symbols alone to distinguish between benign and attack traffic is not sufficient, as both traffic types contain packet types that are mapped to the same symbols. Our detection approach is therefore based on estimating the likelihood of observing individual packet types given the sequence of preceding packets. The rationale behind this approach is the observation that IoT device communications usually follow particular characteristic patterns. Traffic generated by IoT malware, however, doesn't follow these patterns and can therefore be detected. We will thus use the detection model to calculate an occurrence probability p i Fig. 4 : Occurrence probabilities of 15 packets from Edimax Plug when Mirai was in standby stage. The red '#0' denotes the malicious packets.
B. Detection Process
for each packet symbol s i given the sequence of k preceding
Parameter k is a property of the used GRU network and denotes the length of the lookback history, i.e., the number of preceding symbols that the GRU takes into account when calculating the probability estimate. From Fig. 3b we can see that these probability estimates are on average higher for packets belonging to benign traffic patterns, and lower for packets generated by malware on an infected device and can therefore be flagged as anomalous. Definition 1 (Anomalous packets): Packet pkt i mapped to packet symbol s i is anomalous, if its occurrence probability p i is below detection threshold δ, i.e., if
We performed an extensive empirical analysis of the probability estimates provided by device-specific detection models for both benign and attack traffic for the datasets described in Sect. VI and could determine that a value of δ = 10 −2 provides a good separation between benign and attack traffic, as can be also seen in Fig. 3b . An example of our approach is shown in Fig. 4 . Malicious packets (represented by symbol '#0') get very low probability estimates (<10 −4 ), distinguishing them clearly from benign packets. However, their presence at indices 6 − 7 also affects the estimate of the benign packet '#41' at index 8 (<10 −6 ), since the sequence of packets preceding this packet is unknown to the detection model. Triggering an anomaly each time an anomalous packet is observed would lead to numerous false positive detections, as also benign traffic may contain noise that is not covered by the GRU model and will therefore receive low occurrence probability estimates. An anomaly is therefore triggered only in the case that a significant number of packets in a window of consecutive packets are anomalous.
Definition 2 (Anomaly triggering condition): Given a window W of w consecutive packets W = (pkt 1 , pkt 2 , . . . , pkt w ) represented by symbol sequence S = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . s w ), we 
IV. FEDERATED LEARNING APPROACH
The GRU models are learned using traffic collected at several Security Gateways, each monitoring a client IoT network. Each Security Gateway observing a device of a particular type type#k contributes to training its anomaly detection model. We take a federated learning approach to implement the distributed learning of models from several clients. Federated learning is a communication-efficient and privacy-preserving learning approach suited for distributed optimization of Deep Neural Networks (DNN) [19] , [20] . In federated learning, clients do not share their training data but rather train a local model and send model updates to a centralized entity which aggregates them. Federated learning is chosen because it is suitable [21] for scenarios where:
• data are massively distributed, so that there is a large number of clients each having a small amount of data. IoT devices typically generate little traffic, which means only little data can be provided by each client alone. • contributions from clients are imbalanced. In our system, the training data available at each Security Gateway depends on the duration that an IoT device has been in the network and the amount of interaction it has had, which varies largely between clients.
A. Learning Process
The federated training process is illustrated in Fig. 5 . Each Security Gateway having devices of a particular type type#k in its network requests a detection profile for this type from IoT Security Service in Step 1 and gets an initial GRU model for this type in Step 2. At the start of DÏOT, this model is random, otherwise it is already trained through several rounds of the following process. In Step 3 the global model is retrained locally by each Security Gateway with traces collected by monitoring communication of the type#k devices. Then in Step 4 local updates made to the model by each Security Gateway are reported to IoT Security Service which in Step 5 aggregates them as defined in Def.3 [21] to improve the global model. Finally, the updated global model for type#k devices is then pushed back to Security Gateway and used for anomaly detection (Step 6). The re-training of the model is performed on a regular basis to improve its accuracy.
Definition 3 (Global Model Aggregation): Given n clients with their associated model weights W 1 , . . . , W n trained by associated number of data samples s 1 , . . . , s n . We define the global model G which is aggregated from those local models as follows:
To train our models we adopt an approach introduced by McMahan et al. [21] . Each client (Security Gateway) trains its GRU model locally for several epochs before reporting updates to IoT Security Service. This limits the communication overhead by reducing the number of updates to send to the IoT Security Service. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to employ a federated learning approach for anomaly detection-based intrusion detection.
B. Federated Learning Setup
We implemented the federated learning algorithm utilizing the flask [22] and flask socketio [23] libraries for the serverside application and the socketIO-client [24] library for the client-side application. The socketIO-client uses the gevent asynchronous framework [25] which provides a clean API for concurrency and network related tasks. We used the Keras [26] library with Tensorflow backend to implement the GRU network with the parameters selected in Sect. V-B.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate DÏOT, we apply it on the use case of detecting real-life IoT malware. We selected Mirai for this purpose, since its source code is publicly available and several infamous malware variants like Hajime [2] or Persirai [27] have been implemented using the same code base. Mirai also realizes similar attack stages (detailed in Sect. V-A3 below) as stateof-the-art IoT malware [3] , [28] . This makes Mirai a highly relevant baseline for IoT malware behavior.
A. Datasets
We collected extensive datasets about the communication behavior of IoT devices in laboratory and real-world deployment settings. The monitored devices included 33 typical consumer IoT devices like IP cameras, smart power plugs and light bulbs, sensors, etc. The devices were mapped by our device-type-identification method to 23 unique device types. The detailed list of devices and assignment to device-types can be found in Tab. II. We collected datasets by setting up a laboratory network as shown in Fig. 6 IoT devices were connected. On the gateway we collected all network traffic packets originating from the monitored devices using tcpdump.
1) Activity dataset: A key characteristic of IoT devices is that they expose only a few distinct actions accessible to users, e.g., ON, OFF, ADJUST, etc. To capture the communication patterns related to user interactions with IoT devices, we collected a dataset encompassing all such actions being invoked on the respective IoT devices. We repeatedly performed actions shown in Tab. IV. Each of the actions was repeated 20 times (20-time repetition chosen as a rule of thumb). To capture also less intensive usage patterns, the dataset was augmented with longer measurements of two to three hours, during which actions were triggered only occasionally. This dataset contains data from 33 IoT devices out of which 27 have both action and standby data. Six devices (lighting and home automation hubs) have standby data only because they do not provide meaningful actions that users could invoke.
2) Deployment dataset: To evaluate DÏOT in a realistic smart home deployment setting, in particular with regard to how many false alarms it will raise, we installed a number of (n = 14) different smart home IoT devices 1 in several different domestic deployment scenarios. This deployment involved real users and collected communication traces of these devices under realistic usage conditions. We used the same set-up as in the laboratory network for the domestic deployment, albeit we excluded the attack server. Users used and interacted with the IoT devices as part of their everyday life. Packet traces were collected continuously during one week.
3) Attack dataset: For evaluating the effectiveness of DÏOT at detecting attacks, we collected a dataset comprising malicious traffic of IoT devices infected with Mirai malware [1] , [3] in all four different attack stages discussed below: preinfection, infection, scanning and DoS attacks (as a monetization stage). Additionally, we collected traffic when Mirai was in a standby mode, i.e., not performing any attack but awaiting commands from its Command & Control server. Among 33 experimental devices, we found 5 devices which are vulnerable to the Mirai malware. The Attack dataset was collected from those five devices: D-LinkCamDCS930L ,  TABLE II: 33 IoT devices used in the Activity, Deployment and Attack datasets and their connectivity technologies + Affectation of these devices to 23 DÏOT device types during evaluation.
Device-type Identifier Device model W i F i E t h e r n e t O t h e r A c t i v i t y D e p l o y m e n t A t t a c k type#01
ApexisCam Apexis IP Camera APM-J011
EdnetCam Ednet Wireless indoor IP camera Cube
EdnetGateway Ednet.living Starter kit power Gateway
HomeMaticPlug Homematic pluggable switch HMIP-PS
Netatmo Netatmo weather station with wind gauge In the pre-infection stage, Loader sends a set of commands via telnet to the vulnerable IoT device to prepare its environment and identify an appropriate method for uploading the Mirai binary files. We repeated the pre-infection process 50 times for each device. During each run, around 900 preinfection-related packets were generated.
After pre-infection the infection stage commences, during which Loader uploads Mirai binary files to the IoT device. It supports three upload methods: wget, tftp and echo (in this priority order). To infect the two D-Link cameras and the Ubnt router Loader uses wget, on the Edimax plugs it will resort to using tftp as these are installed on the devices by default. We repeated the infection process 50 times for each device, each run generating approximately 700 data packets.
In the scanning stage we collected packets while the infected devices were actively performing a network scan in order to locate other vulnerable devices. Data collection was performed for five minutes per device, resulting in a dataset of more than 446,000 scanning data packets.
We extensively tested the DoS attack stage, utilizing all ten different DoS attack vectors (for details, see [29] ) available in the Mirai source code [30] . We ran all attacks separately on all five compromised devices for five minutes each, generating more than 20 million packets of attack traffic in total.
Tab. III summarizes the sizes and numbers of distinct packets and packet flows in the different datasets. While packet flows can't be directly mapped to distinct device actions, they do provide a rough estimate of the overall level of activity of the targeted devices in the dataset.
B. Parameter Selection
Based on initial experiments with our datasets (Tab. III) we inferred that a lookback history of k = 20 symbols is sufficient to capture most communication interactions with sufficient accuracy. We used a GRU network with three hidden layers of size 128 neurons each. The size of the input and output layers is device-type-specific and equal to the number of mapping symbols of the function mapping type#k , which is equal to | B type#k | (cf. Sect. III-A). We learned 23 anomaly detection models, each corresponding to a device type identified using the method described in Sect. II-C. Each anomaly detection model was trained with, and respectively tested on, communication from all devices matching the considered type.
C. Evaluation Metrics
We use false positive and true positive rate (FPR and TPR) as measures of fitness. FPR measures the rate at which benign communication is incorrectly classified as anomalous by our method causing a false alarm to be raised. TPR is the rate at which attacks are correctly reported as anomalous. We seek to minimize FPR, since otherwise the system easily becomes unusable, as the user would be overwhelmed with false alarms. At the same time we want to maximize TPR so that as many attacks as possible will be detected by our approach.
Testing for false positives was performed by four-fold crossvalidation for device types in the Activity and Deployment datasets. The data were divided equally into four folds using three folds for training and one for testing. To determine the FPR, we divided the testing dataset according to Def. 2 into windows of w = 250 packets. Since the testing data contained only benign communications, any triggered anomaly alarm for packets of the window indicated it as a false positive, whereas windows without alarms were considered a true negative.
Testing for true positives was done by using the Activity and Deployment datasets as training data and the Attack dataset for testing with the same settings as for false positive testing. Moreover, as we know that the Attack dataset also contains benign traffic corresponding to normal operations of the IoT devices, we were interested in the average duration until detection. Therefore, in each window of w = 250 packets we calculated the number of packets required until an anomaly alarm was triggered in order to estimate the average detection time. In terms of TPR, such windows were considered true positives, whereas windows without triggered alarms were considered false negatives. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Accuracy
To determine appropriate values for the detection threshold δ and anomaly triggering threshold γ, we evaluated FPR using the Activity (33 devices, 23 device types) dataset and TPR using the Attack (5 devices, 3 device types) dataset for a fixed window size of w = 250. Fig. 7 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of FPR and TPR in dependence of these parameters. We can see that all curves quickly reach over 0.9 TPR while keeping a very low FPR (<0.01), which is one of the main objectives for our approach. We therefore select δ = 0.01 and γ = 0.5 at w = 250, which achieves 94.01% TPR at <0.01 FPR.
Using these selected parameters in the Deployment (14 devices, 10 device types) dataset and Attack (5 devices) dataset, we achieved an attack detection rate of 95.60% TPR and no false positives, i.e., 0% FPR during one week of evaluation. These results show that DÏOT can successfully address challenge C3, reporting no false alarms in a real-world deployment setting. Tab. V shows the detailed performance of our system for different attack scenarios (cf. Sect. V). The time to detect attacks varies according to the traffic intensity of the attacks. The average detection delay over all tested attacks is 257 ± 194 ms. DÏOT can detect an attack in the pre-infection stage after 223 packets while Mirai generates more than 900 packets during pre-infection. It means DÏOT is able to detect the attack even before the attack proceeds to the infection stage.
The detection rate for DoS attacks is lower than for other attack stages. However, all DoS attacks are eventually detected because DoS attacks have a high throughput (1, 412.94 packets/s.) and we analyze five windows of 250 packets per second at this rate. Considering the 88.96% TPR we achieve on DoS attacks, four windows out of five are detected as anomalous and trigger an alarm. It is also worth noting that infected devices in standby mode get detected in 33.33% of cases, while this activity is very stealthy (0.05 packets/s). Fig. 8 : Evolution of TPR and FPR as we increase the number of clients in federated learning. TPR decreases slightly (-3%) while FPR reaches 0 (-21%) when using 15 clients.
B. Efficiency of Federated Learning
We conducted a set of experiments to evaluate federated learning performance with different numbers of clients (ranging from 2 to 15) contributing to the training of the models. We selected the number of epochs that each client trains its local model to be 17 and specified the number of communication rounds between clients and server to be 3. Therefore, the local models were trained a total of 51 epochs. This was deemed sufficient since in our initial experiments utilizing a centralized learning setting the models converged after approximately 50 epochs. Each client was allocated a randomized subset of training data from the Deployment dataset (ranging from 0.1% to 10% of the total training dataset size) and we evaluated the system's performance for different numbers of clients involved in building the federated model. In average, each client takes approximately one second to train one local epoch on its data. We repeated our experiment three times for each device type, with random re-sampling of the training datasets. As expected, Fig. 8 shows that the federated models with more participating clients achieve better FPR, while TPR deteriorates only slightly.
Federated learning provides better privacy for clients contributing to training as they do not need to share their training data. However, this may result in a loss of accuracy of the obtained model in comparison to training the model in a centralized manner. To evaluate this possible loss in accuracy, we trained three federated models using the entire training dataset by dividing it among 5, 9 or 15 clients and comparing these to a model trained in a centralized manner. Tab. VI shows a small decrease in TPR as we increase the number of clients This small drop in TPR is not a concern since a large number of packet windows would still trigger an alarm for any attack stage. Fig. 9 shows an example of detection model performance for two Edimax smart plug devices (models 1101W & 2101W) in dependency of the amount of data used for training the model. We divided the 7-day Deployment dataset into onehour data chunks and randomly sampled different amounts of data chunks for training the model, gradually increasing the training dataset size. The figure shows that the FPR decreases noticeably when the training dataset grows. More importantly, the model needs less than 25 hours of data to achieve FPR = 0. It shows that our detection model needs little data for training and it means DÏOT can address challenge C4. Moreover, with the help of our federated learning approach leveraging several clients contributing to training the model, each client needs only a small amount of data i.e, 2.5 hours if there are ten clients involved. It justifies our assumption A1 as mentioned in Sect. II-B.
C. Data Needed for Training
D. Efficiency of Device-Type-Specific Models and Scalability
Traditional anomaly detection approaches utilizing a single model for modeling benign behavior easily suffer from increasing false positive rates or decreasing sensitivity when the number of different types of behaviors (i.e., device types) captured by the model grows. This makes them unsuitable for real-world deployments with hundreds or thousands of different device types. Our solution, however, does not have this drawback, as it uses a dedicated detection model for each device type (details in Sect. III). Each of these models focuses solely on the characteristic behavior of one single device type, resulting in more specific and accurate behavioral models, independent of the number of different device types handled by the system. To evaluate the benefit of using device-typespecific anomaly detection models compared to using a single model for all devices, we evaluated a single model on the whole Deployment dataset using 4-fold-cross validation and evaluated detection accuracy on the Attack dataset. The result is as expected: FPR increases from 0% to 0.67% while TPR increases from 95.6% to 97.21%. However, as mentioned in Sect. II, a high false alarm rate would make the anomaly detection system impractical. If the system had FPR of 0.67% in our deployment setup, it would trigger around eight alarms per day. It means a smarthome with dozens of devices could have hundreds of false alarms per day.
E. Performance
We evaluated the processing performance of GRU without specific performance optimizations on a laptop and a desktop computer. The laptop ran Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with an Intel©Core™i7-4600 CPU with 8GB of memory, whereas the desktop ran Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with an Intel©Core™i7-7700 CPU with 8GB of memory and a Radeon RX 460 core graphic card. We evaluated the processing performance of GRU without specific optimizations on a laptop and a desktop computer. The laptop ran Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with an Intel i7-4600 CPU with 8GB of memory, whereas the desktop ran Ubuntu Linux 18.04 with an Intel i7-7700 CPU with 8GB of memory and a Radeon RX 460 core graphics card with GPU. Average processing time per symbol (packet) for prediction was 0.081(±0.001) ms for the desktop utilizing its GPU and 0.592(±0.001) ms when executed on the laptop with CPU. On average, training a GRU model for one device type took 26 minutes on the desktop and 71 minutes on the laptop hardware when considering a week's worth of data in the Deployment dataset. We conclude from this that model training will be feasible to realize in real deployment scenarios, as training will in any case be done gradually as data are collected from the network over longer periods of time.
VII. EFFECTIVENESS
A. Generalizability of Anomaly Detection
Although we focused our evaluation on the most wellknown IoT malware so far: Mirai [1] for the use case, DÏOT is likely effective also in detecting other botnet malware like Persirai [27] , Hajime [2] , etc. DÏOT's anomaly detection leverages deviations in the behavior of infected IoT devices caused by the malware. Such deviations will be observable for any malware.
B. Evolution of IoT Device Behavior
The behavior of an IoT device type can evolve due to, e.g., firmware updates that bring new functionality. This modifies its behavior and may trigger false alarms for legitimate communication. We prevent these false alarms by correlating anomaly reports from all Security Gateways at the IoT Security Service. Assuming firmware updates would be propagated to many client networks in a short time, if alarms are reported from a large number of security gateways for the same device type in a short time, we can cancel the alarm and trigger re-learning of the corresponding device identification and anomaly detection models to adapt to this new behavior. To ensure that sudden widespread outbreaks of an IoT malware infection campaign are not erroneously interpreted as firmware updates, the canceling of an alarm can be confirmed by a human expert at the IoT Security Service. This should represent a small burden, as the roll-out of firmware updates is a relatively seldom event.
C. Mimicking Legitimate Communication
An adversary that has compromised an IoT device can attempt to mimic the device's legitimate communication patterns to try to remain undetected. However, as the devicetype-specific detection model is restricted to the (relatively limited) functionality of the IoT device, it is in practice very difficult for the adversary to mimic legitimate communication and at the same time achieve a malicious purpose, e.g., scanning, flooding, etc., especially when considering that any change in packet flow semantics is also likely to change the characteristics (protocol, packet size, port, etc.) of packets and their ordering, which are both used for detecting anomalies in the packet sequence. Moreover, adversaries would need to know the device-type-specific communication patterns in order to mimic them. This makes it significantly harder for adversaries to develop large scale IoT malware that affects a wide range of different IoT device types in the way that, e.g., Mirai does.
D. Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial examples. If an adversary manages to compromise an IoT device while remaining undetected, it can attempt to 'poison' the training process of the system by forging packets as adversarial examples that are specifically meant to influence the learning of the model in such a way that malicious activities are not detected by it. There exist techniques to forge adversarial examples to neural networks [31] . However, these apply to images [32] , [33] and audio inputs [34] , [35] , where objective functions for the underlying optimization problem are easy to define. Forging adversarial examples consists of finding minimal modifications for an input x of class C such that x+ is classified as C = C. For example, in our case this would mean that a malicious packet is incorrectly classified as a benign one. In contrast to image or audio processing, however, our features (symbols) are not raw but processed from packet properties. First, it means that modifications are computed for our symbolic representation of packet sequences which are difficult to realize in a way that would preserve their utility for the adversary, i.e., realize 'useful' adversarial functionality required for malicious activities like scanning or DoS. Second, it is difficult to define the objective distance to minimize in order to achieve "small modifications" since modifying the value of one single packet characteristic (protocol, port, etc.) can change the semantics of a packet entirely.
Poisoning federated learning. For initial model training, we can assume the training data contain only legitimate network traffic, as devices are assumed initially to be benign (assumption A1 (Sect. II-B)). However, the federated setting can be subject to poisoning attacks during re-training, where the adversary uses adversarial examples as described above to corrupt the anomaly detection model so that it eventually will accept malicious traffic as benign [36] (or vice versa). Techniques have been developed for preventing poisoning attacks by using local outlier detection-based filtering of adversarial examples to pre-empt model poisoning [37] .
In the scope of this paper we assume that the Security Gateway is not compromised by the adversary (assumption A2 (Sect. II-B)). However, since a malicious user can have physical access to his Security Gateway, it is thinkable that he could compromise it in order to stage a poisoning attack against the system using adversarial examples. In this case, local filtering of adversarial examples is not possible, as it can not be enforced by the compromised Security Gateway. We are therefore currently focusing our ongoing research efforts on applying poisoning mitigation approaches applied at the IoT Security Service. These include using more robust learning approaches less resilient to adversarial examples that will 'average out' the effects of adversarial examples, as well as approaches similar to, e.g., Shen et al. [38] , where malicious model updates are detected before they are incorporated in global detection models.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Several solutions have been proposed for the detection and prevention of intrusions in IoT networks [39] , [40] , sensor networks [9] and industrial control systems [41] , [42] . SVELTE [40] is an intrusion detection system for protecting IoT networks from already known attacks. It adapts existing intrusion detection techniques to IoT-specific protocols, e.g., 6LoWPAN. Similarly, Doshi at al. [6] proposed a signaturebased approach to detect known DDoS attacks using features representing the density of the network traffic. In contrast, DÏOT performs dynamic detection of any unknown attacks that deviate from the legitimate behavior of the device, since it only models legitimate network traffic. Jia et al. [39] proposed a context-based system to automatically detect sensitive actions in IoT platforms. This system is designed for patching vulnerabilities in appified IoT platforms such as Samsung SmartThings. It is not applicable to multi-vendor IoT systems while DÏOT is platform independent.
Detecting anomalies in network traffic has a long history [7] , [8] , [43] , [44] . Existing approaches rely on analysing single network packets [7] or clustering large numbers of packets [8] , [9] to detected intrusions or compromised services. Some works have proposed, as we do, to model communication as a language [42] , [43] . For instance, authors of [43] derive finite state automatons from layer 3-4 communication protocol specifications. Monitored packets are processed by the automaton to detect deviations from protocol specification or abnormally high usage of specific transitions. Automatons can only model short sequences of packets while we use GRU to model longer sequences, which enables the detection of stealthy attacks. Also, modelling protocol specifications is coarse and leaves room for circumventing detection. In contrast, we use finer grained-features that are difficult to forge while preserving the adversarial utility of malicious packets.
Lately, recurrent neural networks (RNN) have been used for several anomaly-detection purposes. Most applications leverage Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks for detecting anomalies in time series [45] , aircraft data [46] or system logs [47] . Oprea at al. [48] use deep belief networks for mining DNS log data and detect infections in enterprise networks. In contrast to these works, DÏOT uses a different flavor of RNN, namely GRU that can be learned using less training data, enabling DÏOT to be trained faster, and operate in real-time, detecting anomalies in live network traffic instead of utilizing off-line analysis.
IX. SUMMARY
In this paper we introduced DÏOT: a self-learning system for detecting compromised devices in IoT networks. Our solution relies on novel automated techniques for device-typespecific anomaly detection. DÏOT does not require any human intervention or labeled data to operate. It learns anomaly detection models autonomously, using unlabeled crowdsourced data captured in client IoT networks. We demonstrated the efficacy of anomaly detection in detecting a large set of malicious behavior from devices infected by the Mirai malware. DÏOT detected 95.6% of attacks in 257 milliseconds on average and without raising any false alarm when evaluated in a real-world deployment.
